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Abstract
In the face of uncertainty, ecosystems can provide natural insurance to risk averse
users of ecosystem services. We employ a conceptual ecological-economic model to
analyze the allocation of (endogenous) risk and ecosystem quality by risk averse
ecosystem managers who have access to ﬁnancial insurance, and study the implica-
tions for individually and socially optimal ecosystem management, and policy design.
We show that while an improved access to ﬁnancial insurance leads to lower ecosys-
tem quality, the eﬀect on the free-rider problem and on welfare is determined by
ecosystem properties. We derive conditions on ecosystem functioning under which,
if ﬁnancial insurance becomes more accessible, (i) the extent of optimal regulation
increases or decreases; and (ii) welfare, in the absence of environmental regulation,
increases or decreases.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: Q57, H23, D81, D62
Keywords: ecosystem quality, ecosystem services, ecosystem management, endoge-
nous environmental risk, insurance, risk-aversion, uncertainty
∗Corresponding author: Martin Quaas, Department of Ecological Modelling, UFZ–Centre for
Environmental Research Leipzig-Halle, Permoser Str. 15, D-04318 Leipzig, Germany. Email:
martin.quaas@ufz.de.1 Introduction
Ecosystems provide many valuable services, including goods such as food, fuel or
ﬁber, and services such as pollination or the regulation of local climate, pests, dis-
eases or water runoﬀ from a watershed (Daily 1997, Millennium Ecosystem Assess-
ment 2005). In a world of uncertainty, human well-being depends not only on the
mean level at which such services are being provided, but also on their statistical
distribution. Biodiversity can reduce the variance at which desired ecosystem ser-
vices are provided. This means, biodiversity can provide a natural insurance to
risk averse users of ecosystem services. Since increasing biodiversity generates such
an insurance value for ecosystem managers, they tend to employ more conserva-
tive management strategies in the face of uncertainty (Baumg¨ artner forthcoming,
Baumg¨ artner and Quaas 2006). This tends to reduce the overuse of public natural
resources (Bramoull´ e and Treich 2005, Sandler and Sterbenz 1990, Sandler et al.
1987).
On the other hand, rather than making use of natural insurance, ecosystem
users can also use ﬁnancial insurance to hedge their income risk. For example,
in the USA for over one hundred years crop yield insurance is oﬀered to manage
agricultural risk. Since traditional crop yield insurance is particularly vulnerable to
classical insurance problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection (e.g. Luo
et al. 1994), considerable eﬀort is recently spent to develop alternative possibilities
of ﬁnancial insurance for farmers, e.g. index-based insurance contracts (Miranda and
Vedenov 2001, Skees et al. 2002, World Bank 2004).
While this eﬀort to develop instruments of ﬁnancial insurance is motivated by the
idea that reducing income risk is beneﬁcial for ecosystem users, some studies have
shown that ﬁnancial insurance tends to have ecologically negative eﬀects. Horowitz
and Lichtenberg (1993) show that ﬁnancially insured farmers are likely to undertake
riskier production – with higher nitrogen and pesticide use – than uninsured farmers
do. A similar result is pointed out in Mahul (2001), assuming a weather-based
insurance. Wu (1999) empirically estimates the impact of insurance on the crop mix
and its negative results on soil erosion in Nebraska (USA).
In this paper, we analyze how risk-averse ecosystem managers make use of the
natural insurance function of biodiversity and of ﬁnancial insurance. We address the
question of how the availability of ﬁnancial insurance aﬀects the overuse of natural
resources and social welfare when ecosystem management measures generate both
a private beneﬁt and, via ecosystem processes at higher hierarchical levels, positive
externalities on other ecosystem users.
1The analysis is based on a conceptual ecological-economic model. Ecosystem
services (e.g. pollination of orchards by insects) are random because of exogenous
sources of risk (e.g. winter temperature); their distribution (mean and variance) is
determined by ecosystem quality (biodiversity). Ecosystem quality, in turn, can be
inﬂuenced by management action (e.g. setting aside land for wetlands and hedges as
habitat for insects) that aﬀects ecosystem processes at diﬀerent scales. Ecosystem
users are risk-averse and choose a management action such as to maximize utility
from ecosystem services (e.g. income from orchard farming). Our modeling of bio-
diversity and the provision of ecosystem services captures important insights about
ecosystem functioning that emerged from recent theoretical, experimental and ob-
servational research in ecology (Hooper et al. 2005, Kinzig et al. 2002, Loreau et al.
2001, 2002, Holling 2001, Levin 2000, Peterson et al. 1998, Tilman 1994, O’Neill
1986).1 Among other insights two ‘stylized facts’ about biodiversity and ecosystem
functioning emerged which are of crucial importance for the issue studied here:
1. Local biodiversity is aﬀected by ecosystem processes at diﬀerent hierarchical
scales. Ecosystems are hierarchically structured, with processes operating at
diﬀerent spatial and temporal scales and interacting across scales. Species
diversity is typically inﬂuenced diﬀerently by processes at diﬀerent scales. Ac-
cordingly, biodiversity management measures at diﬀerent scales have diﬀerent
impact on local biodiversity.
2. Biodiversity may reduce the variance of ecosystem services. In many instances,
an increase in the level of biodiversity monotonically decreases the tempo-
ral and spatial variability of the level at which these ecosystem services are
provided under changing environmental conditions. This eﬀect decreases in
magnitude with the level of biodiversity.
These stylized ecological facts are of economic relevance.2 Biodiversity increasing
management provides users with natural insurance in terms of a reduced variance
of ecosystem services. In particular, an individual manager’s action aﬀects biodi-
versity via ecosystem processes at diﬀerent scales. At a lower scale, beneﬁts accrue
1The article by Hooper et al. (2005) is a committee report commissioned by the Governing
Board of the Ecological Society of America. Some of its authors have previously been on opposite
sides of the debate. This report surveys the relevant literature, identiﬁes a consensus of current
knowledge as well as open questions, and can be taken to represent the best currently available
ecological knowledge about biodiversity and ecosystem functioning.
2For a more detailed and encompassing discussion of these ﬁndings, and references to the
literature, see Baumg¨ artner (forthcoming), Baumg¨ artner and Quaas (2006) and Hooper et al.
(2005).
2exclusively to him. At a higher scale, his action contributes to increasing local bio-
diversity for other users, thereby generating a positive externality. For example, by
setting aside land on his farm as habitat for insects, an individual farmer increases
the local level of biodiversity on his farm and also contributes – via metapopulation
dynamics (Hanski 1999, Levins 1969) – to biodiversity on other farms.
Our analysis of environmental risk, ecosystem management and purchase of ﬁ-
nancial insurance brings together three separate strands in the literature: (i) In
the environmental economics literature, Crocker and Shogren (1999, 2001, 2003)
and Shogren and Crocker (1999) have developed the idea that environmental risk
is endogenous, that is, economic decision makers bearing environmental risk may
inﬂuence their risk through their actions. They have formalized decision making
under uncertainty in this context by conceptualizing ecosystems as lotteries. (ii)
In the literature on the use (or provision) of a public good under uncertainty, the
conventional wisdom seems to be that the more uncertainty and the higher the risk
aversion of individual decision makers, the less severe is the problem of overuse (or
under-provision) of the public good (Bramoull´ e and Treich 2005, Sandler and Ster-
benz 1990, Sandler et al. 1987). The focus in this literature is on the properties
of the utility function, while the production of the public good (or public bad) is
typically modelled in a trivial way, i.e. one unit of money spent on providing the
public good equals one unit of the public good provided. (iii) In the insurance eco-
nomics literature, the analysis of the trade-oﬀ between ‘self insurance’ (by acting
such as to reduce a potential income loss) or ‘self protection’ (by acting such as to
reduce the probability of an income loss) on the one hand, and ‘market insurance’
on the other hand goes back to Ehrlich and Becker (1972). One standard result is
that self insurance and market insurance are substitutes, with the result that market
insurance, as it becomes cheaper, may drive out self insurance. In this paper, we
bring together these three lines of argument.
We study an economy where individual ecosystem managers face a trade-oﬀ
between obtaining natural insurance from ecosystem management and hedging in-
come risk with ﬁnancial insurance. We show that natural insurance by conservative
ecosystem management and ﬁnancial insurance coverage are substitutes. Hence,
availability of ﬁnancial insurance reduces the demand for natural insurance from
ecosystems and, thus, leads to a less conservative management action which results
in lower ecosystem quality. In particular, the lower the costs of ﬁnancial insurance
are (i.e. the more actuarially fair the risk premium of ﬁnancial insurance is), the less
conservative are the individually optimal management actions and the lower is the
resulting ecosystem quality.
3Yet, the eﬀect of an improved access to ﬁnancial insurance on the free-rider
problem is ambiguous. We show that this relationship crucially depends on the
ecosystem’s properties, and that the extent of the optimal regulatory intervention
may decrease or increase depending on the relative eﬀects of management measures
on biodiversity via the lower, i.e. local, and the higher, i.e. global, scale. We further
derive a condition on ecosystem functioning under which increasing costs of ﬁnancial
insurance decrease or increase welfare in the laissez-faire equilibrium. These results
are highly policy relevant: while at ﬁrst sight the introduction of, or improved access
to, ﬁnancial insurance seems to be beneﬁcial from a welfare point of view, our results
demonstrate that – depending on ecosystem properties – it may have adverse welfare
eﬀects.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we specify the ecological-
economic model. The analysis and results are presented in Section 3, with all proofs
and formal derivations contained in the Appendix. Section 4 discusses the results
and concludes.
2 Ecological-economic model
We consider an ecosystem which is managed for some ecosystem service it pro-
vides. Due to stochastic ﬂuctuations in environmental conditions the provision of
the ecosystem service is uncertain. Its statistical distribution depends on the state
of the ecosystem in terms of ‘ecosystem quality’ (biodiversity), which is inﬂuenced
by how the system is being managed. As a result, the statistical distribution of
ecosystem service and, hence, of income depend on ecosystem management. We
capture these relationships in a stylized ecological-economic model as follows.
2.1 Ecosystem management
There are n ecosystem managers, numbered by i = 1,...,n. Each ecosystem man-
ager can choose a level xi of individual eﬀort to improve ecosystem quality. To be
speciﬁc, we think of xi as an area of land which is protected as habitat for the species
relevant for the provision of the ecosystem service under consideration.
We consider two spatial scales in the model: the ‘local’ scale which is solely
inﬂuenced by individual conservation eﬀort xi of user i, and the ‘global’ scale on
which the aggregate eﬀort X = x1 + ... + xn of all n ecosystem users matters.
The level of ecosystem quality qi is speciﬁc to user i. It is a function of the
biodiversity of two types of species whose dynamics are being governed by ecosystem
processes at the local scale and the global scale respectively. For instance, the ﬁrst
4type could be species with small dispersal rates (e.g. plants) while the second type
could be species with relatively large dispersal ranges (e.g. insects).
For both types of species, a species-area relationship holds: the species number
is a power function of the land area set aside as habitat (McArthur and Wilson
1967, Rosenzweig 1995). Thus, the species numbers are xα
i for the species type for
which local management is relevant and Xβ for the species type for which global
management eﬀorts matter. In the ecological literature, the exponents α and β are
usually referred to as the ‘slope’ of the species-area relationship (i.e., the slope of the
corresponding curve on a double-logarithmic scale). In general, α and β will diﬀer;
the slopes lie between 0.1 and 0.6 for diﬀerent ecosystems with values around 0.25 for
most of the observed ecosystems (Durrett and Levin 1996, Hanski and Gyllenberg
1997, Rosenzweig 1995).
Local ecosystem quality qi depends on individual and aggregate management
eﬀort in the following way:3










where α, β ∈ [0,1] and ζ ≤ 1. All ecosystem users are assumed to face the same
type of ecosystem, so that the function q(·,·) has no index i.
Assumption (1) expresses the idea that the level of ecosystem quality relevant to
user i is determined by both individual management eﬀort xi taken by user i and
positive externalities from the joint eﬀort X of all ecosystem managers. How the
function qi depends on xi and X reﬂects the hierarchical structure of the ecosystem:
it captures how individual eﬀort xi aﬀects local ecological processes, how aggregate
eﬀort X aﬀects ecological processes at the global scale, and how these processes
interact to determine local ecosystem quality. In the extreme, β = 0, corresponds
to a situation where only local ecological processes are relevant and therefore man-
agement eﬀort is purely private with no spill-overs to others. In the other extreme,
α = 0 corresponds to a situation where local ecosystem quality is completely de-
termined by higher-scale ecological processes, so that management eﬀort is a pure
public good.
The parameter ζ measures the substitutability of the two species types for local
ecosystem quality. For ζ = 1, both types are perfect substitutes and all that matters
3Similar speciﬁcations have been used in other environmental economics studies. Eppink and
Withagen (2006) use the sum of local and global biodiversity, which is a special case of (1) for
ζ = 1. Barbier and Rauscher (2006) use the special case of (1) with α = β = 1. Note that




ζ + (1 − γ)

Xβζi1/ζ
contains this limit case as x
γα
i + X(1−γ)β. For notational simplicity,
we use (1).
5is the sum of species richness of both types. For ζ → −∞, the two species groups are
perfect complements and local ecosystem quality is limited by the species richness of
the group with less biodiversity. In many cases, negative values of ζ seem plausible,
reﬂecting some degree of complementarity between species (Tilman 1997).
Given ecosystem quality qi, the ecosystem provides user i with the ecosystem
service at a level si which is random. For simplicity we assume that the ecosystem
service directly translates into monetary income and that the mean level Esi = µ of
ecosystem service is independent of ecosystem quality and constant.4 The variance
of ecosystem services depends on ecosystem quality qi as follows
varsi = σ
2(qi) = max{(η − qi)
1/ ,0}, (2)
where η > 0 and  < 1. In the case  = 0, the speciﬁcation (2) becomes σ2(q) =
exp(−q/η). Again, since all managers face the same type of ecosystem, the prob-
ability distribution of the ecosystem service is the same for all users who have the
same ecosystem quality q.
Speciﬁcation (2) includes (for diﬀerent ) a large variety of functions which are
compatible with the ecological evidence discussed in the introduction: for each user,
the variance of ecosystem service provision decreases with ecosystem quality q. This
eﬀect decrease in magnitude with the level of ecosystem quality. For  > 0, it
is possible to obtain the ecosystem service at zero variance, provided ecosystem
quality is high enough. This is not possible for  < 0. That is, a larger  describes
an ecosystem with higher natural insurance function.
2.2 Financial insurance
In order to analyze the inﬂuence of availability of ﬁnancial insurance on the ecosys-
tem managers’ choice of activity level xi, we introduce ﬁnancial insurance in a simple
and stylized way. We assume that manager i has the option of buying ﬁnancial in-
surance under the following contract: (i) The insurant chooses the fraction ai ∈ [0,1]
of insurance coverage. (ii) He receives (pays)
ai (Esi − si) (3)
from (to) the insurance company as an actuarially fair indemniﬁcation beneﬁt (in-
surance premium) if his realized income is below (above) the mean income.5 (iii) In
4Ecological evidence suggests that µ increases with q (Tilman 1997, Hooper et al. 2005). We in-
cluded such a relationship into a previous version of the model, but left it out here, as it complicates
the analysis without generating further insights.
5This beneﬁt/premium-scheme is actuarially fair, because the insurance company has an ex-
pected net payment stream of E[ai (Esi − si)] = 0. This model of insurance is fully equivalent to
6addition, he pays the transaction costs of insurance and the insurance company’s
proﬁt mark-up. The costs of insurance over and above the actuarially fair insurance
premium, which are a measure of the ‘real’ costs of insurance to the insurant, are
assumed to follow the cost function
δ ai varsi , (4)
where the parameter δ ≥ 0 describes how actuarially unfair is the insurance contract,
i.e. the ‘costs’ of insurance. We further assume that the costs linearly increase with
the insured part of income variance, i.e., in insurance ‘output’.
This is a highly idealized form of ﬁnancial insurance, which captures in the
most simple way the essence of ﬁnancial insurance with an actuarially fair insurance
premium and some mark-up (e.g. due to transaction costs) on top. The higher the
insurance coverage ai, the lower the risk premium of the resulting income lottery;
and the risk premium can be continuously reduced down to zero by increasing ai to
one. In order to abstract from any problems related to informational asymmetry,
we assume that the statistical distribution as well as the actual level si of ecosystem
service are observable to both insurant and insurance company.
The main focus of our analysis will lie in the comparative statics with respect
to the parameter δ. Thereby we interpret a decrease in δ as an improvement in the
access to, or reduction of the costs of, ﬁnancial insurance.6
2.3 Income, preferences and decision
Each ecosystem manager i chooses the level of ecosystem management eﬀort xi and
ﬁnancial insurance coverage ai. Improving ecosystem quality carries costs c > 0 per
unit of management eﬀort, which are purely private. Adding up income components,
the manager’s (random) income yi is given by
yi = (1 − ai)si − cxi + ai Esi − δ ai varsi . (5)
Since the ecosystem service si is a random variable, net income yi is a random vari-
able, too. The uncertain part of income is captured by the ﬁrst term in Equation (5),
while the other components are certain. Obviously, increasing ai to one allows one
to reduce the uncertain income component down to zero.
the traditional model of insurance (e.g. Ehrlich and Becker 1972:627) where losses compared with
the maximum income are insured against and one pays a constant insurance premium irrespective
of actual income. In this traditional model, the net payment would exactly amount to (3), cf.
Appendix A.1.
6The parameter δ could be treated as a policy variable, as it could be inﬂuenced by subsidies
or taxes. Yet, we will treat δ as an exogenous parameter.
7The mean Eyi and the variance varyi of the manager’s income yi are determined
by the mean and variance of ecosystem service, which depend on the individual and
aggregate management eﬀorts (Equation 2),
Eyi = µ − cxi − δ ai σ
2(q(xi,X)) and (6)
varyi = (1 − ai)
2 σ
2(q(xi,X)) . (7)
Mean income is given by the mean ecosystem service µ, minus the costs of ecosystem
management eﬀort cxi and the costs of ﬁnancial insurance δ ai σ2(q(xi,X)). For
an actuarially fair ﬁnancial insurance contract (δ = 0), the mean income equals
mean net income from ecosystem use, µ − cxi. The variance of income vanishes
for full insurance coverage, ai = 1, and equals the variance of ecosystem service,
σ2(q(xi,X)), without any ﬁnancial insurance coverage, ai = 0.
All ecosystem managers are assumed to have identical preferences over their un-
certain income yi, and to be risk-averse. From ecology, the mean and the variance
of ecosystem services are known, but rarely their full probability distribution. This
restricts the class of risk preferences which can meaningfully be represented in our
ecological-economic model to utility functions which depend only on the ﬁrst and
second moment of the probability distribution, i.e., on the mean and the variance.
Speciﬁcally, we assume the following expected utility function, where ρ > 0 is a pa-
rameter describing the manager’s degree of risk aversion (Arrow 1965, Pratt 1964):7




3 Analysis and results
The analysis proceeds in three steps: First, we discuss the laissez-faire equilibrium
which arises if the n diﬀerent ecosystem managers individually optimize their man-
agement eﬀort taking the actions of the other managers as given (Section 3.1).
Second, we derive the (symmetric) Pareto-eﬃcient allocation (Section 3.2). Finally,
we investigate how policy measures to internalize the externalities and welfare are
inﬂuenced by the access to ﬁnancial insurance, as described by the parameter δ
(Section 3.3).
7More general utility functions of the mean-variance type would complicate the analysis without
generating further insights.
83.1 Laissez-faire equilibrium
As laissez-faire equilibrium, we consider the allocation which results as Nash-equi-
librium without regulating intervention. Each ecosystem manager’s decision prob-
lem is to maximize his expected utility, taking the actions of all other ecosystem































where X = x1 + ... + xn; all xj for j 6= i are treated as given.
The equilibrium allocation, consisting of the equilibrium levels x?
i of management
eﬀorts, q?
i of ecosystem qualities, and a?
i of ﬁnancial insurance coverages, has the
following properties.
Proposition 1
An (interior) laissez-faire equilibrium exists, is unique and symmetric, that is, all
ecosystem managers choose the same level x? of ecosystem management and the
same fraction a? of ﬁnancial insurance coverage. The equilibrium levels x? of ecosys-
tem management eﬀort and q? of ecosystem quality increase, and the equilibrium










Proof: see Appendix A.2.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. In the absence of transaction costs, i.e.
for δ = 0, the representative ecosystem manager chooses full insurance, i.e. a? = 1.
If transaction costs are present, i.e. if δ > 0, he chooses partial coverage by ﬁnancial
insurance (0 < a? < 1) and if transaction costs are prohibitively high, i.e. if δ → ∞,
he chooses no ﬁnancial insurance coverage (a? = 0). Since natural insurance by
conservative ecosystem management can be employed as a substitute for ﬁnancial
insurance, the equilibrium values of ecosystem management eﬀort and of ecosystem
quality are inﬂuenced by the transaction costs of ﬁnancial insurance: the higher the
transaction costs of ﬁnancial insurance are, the higher are ecosystem management
eﬀort and ecosystem quality in equilibrium.
Obviously, the equilibrium levels of ecosystem management eﬀort, x?, ecosystem
quality, q?, and ﬁnancial insurance coverage, a?, all increase with the degree of risk
aversion, ρ.
93.2 Eﬃcient allocation
The next step is to derive the eﬃcient allocation. Since we are interested in com-
paring the eﬃcient allocation to the laissez-faire equilibrium, we concentrate on the
symmetric Pareto-optimum in which all ecosystem managers make the same eﬀort.
To derive this allocation we deﬁne social welfare as the sum of the utilities of all n




The eﬃcient allocation is derived by choosing the individual levels of management
eﬀort xi and ﬁnancial insurance coverage ai, such as to maximize social welfare



































An (interior) eﬃcient allocation exists, is unique and symmetric, that is, all ecosys-
tem managers make the same management eﬀort ˆ x and have the same fraction ˆ a of
ﬁnancial insurance coverage. The eﬃcient levels ˆ x of ecosystem management eﬀort
and ˆ q of ecosystem quality increase, and the eﬃcient level ˆ a of ﬁnancial insurance










Proof: see Appendix A.3
The diﬀerence between the eﬃcient and the equilibrium allocation is that in the ef-
ﬁcient allocation the positive externality, which each ecosystem manager’s eﬀort has
on the other ecosystem managers due to reduced variance of ecosystem service provi-
sion, is fully internalized. This changes the eﬀect that an increase in the transaction
costs of ﬁnancial insurance has on the management eﬀort and ﬁnancial insurance
coverage in magnitude, but not in sign. Hence, the same arguments hold which
support Proposition 1: with increasing transaction costs δ of ﬁnancial insurance it
is optimal to substitute ﬁnancial insurance by natural insurance.
As in the laissez-faire equilibrium, the eﬃcient levels of ecosystem management
eﬀort, ˆ x, ecosystem quality, ˆ q, and ﬁnancial insurance coverage, ˆ a, all increase with
the degree of risk aversion, ρ.
103.3 Welfare eﬀects of improved access to ﬁnancial insurance
Due to the externalities of individual ecosystem management eﬀort, the laissez-faire
equilibrium is not eﬃcient. In equilibrium, ecosystem managers spend too little
eﬀort to improve ecosystem quality, because they do not take into consideration
the positive externality on other ecosystem users. In order to implement the ef-
ﬁcient allocation as an equilibrium, a regulator could impose a Pigouvian subsidy
on individual management eﬀort. Denoting by τ the subsidy per unit of xi, the
optimization problem of ecosystem manager i under regulation then reads
max
xi,ai






2(q(xi,X)) + τ xi . (11)
Comparing the ﬁrst order conditions for the eﬃcient allocation (i.e. the ﬁrst order
condition of problem (10) for xi) and for the regulated equilibrium (i.e. the ﬁrst
order condition of problem (11) for xi), we obtain the optimal subsidy ˆ τ.
Proposition 3
The eﬃcient allocation is implemented as an equilibrium if a subsidy ˆ τ on individual
ecosystem management eﬀort is set with
ˆ τ = −(n − 1)
h
δ ˆ a +
ρ
2
(1 − ˆ a)
2
i
qX(ˆ x,n ˆ x)σ
20(q(ˆ x,n ˆ x)) > 0 . (12)
The optimal subsidy decreases / is unchanged / increases with the costs δ per unit
of ﬁnancial insurance, i.e. dˆ τ/dδ < = > 0, if and only if
qx(ˆ x,n ˆ x)
qX(ˆ x,n ˆ x)
d
dx
qX(ˆ x,n ˆ x)
qx(ˆ x,n ˆ x)
= (β − α)ζ < = > 0. (13)
Proof: see Appendix A.4.
The Pigouvian subsidy ˆ τ captures the positive externality of ecosystem manager i’s
contribution to ecosystem quality which is due to the insurance value that higher
ecosystem quality has for the n−1 other ecosystem managers. Clearly, the optimal
subsidy is higher, the higher the ecological beneﬁts of aggregate ecosystem conser-
vation eﬀorts are. It thereby also internalizes the (pecuniary) externality that the
individual ecosystem manager’s conservation eﬀort has on the insurance costs of
the other ecosystem managers: due to the decrease in variance, the markup on the
insurance premiums decrease.
The optimal subsidy ˆ τ can be interpreted as a measure of the extent of regulation
necessary to internalize the externalities, i.e. to solve the public-good problem. Thus,
it can also be interpreted as a measure of the size of the externality. Clearly, the
public-good problem depends on the degree of uncertainty faced by the ecosystem
managers, hence, on the availability of ﬁnancial insurance.
11The eﬀect of higher costs of ﬁnancial insurance on the market failure is in gen-
eral ambiguous. Condition (13) states whether increasing costs of ﬁnancial insurance
decrease or increase the market failure. This condition depends on how individual
and aggregate ecosystem management eﬀorts transform into ecosystem quality. If
individual and aggregate management eﬀort are complements, ζ < 0, the market
failure, measured by the Pigouvian subsidy, decreases if β > α, that is, if the per-
centage increase of biodiversity from an increase in aggregate management eﬀort is
higher than from an increase in individual management eﬀort. Thus, with increasing
management eﬀort aggregate management eﬀort becomes less of a limiting factor
for local ecosystem quality and, hence, the eﬀect that higher costs of ﬁnancial in-
surance tend to increase individual eﬀorts dominates and the public good problem
decreases. In contrast, if β < α aggregate management eﬀort becomes more of a
limiting factor. In that case, the public good problem worsens with increasing costs
of ﬁnancial insurance.
If individual and aggregate management eﬀort are substitutes, ζ > 0, the Pigou-
vian subsidy decreases with δ if β < α. With increasing management eﬀort indi-
vidual management eﬀort more and more substitutes aggregate eﬀort and, hence,
the size of the externality decreases. In contrast, if β > α it would be eﬃcient to
substitute individual eﬀort by aggregate eﬀort. Thus, the gap to the equilibrium
allocation widens and, accordingly, the Pigouvian subsidy increases with the costs
of ﬁnancial insurance.
In the limiting case ζ = 0, both eﬀects equal out: the Pigouvian subsidy is
independent of the costs δ of ﬁnancial insurance.
After having studied the eﬀect of ﬁnancial insurance on the public good problem
related to natural insurance, we now turn to the question of how increased costs
of ﬁnancial insurance inﬂuence welfare. In a ﬁrst-best economy, where the external
eﬀect is perfectly internalized, e.g. by the Pigouvian subsidy (12), the answer to this
question is easy. By applying the envelope theorem, we only have to determine the
partial derivative of the welfare function with respect to δ, which is unambiguously
negative – higher costs of ﬁnancial insurance are always welfare decreasing in a
ﬁrst-best world.
This is not necessarily the case in the second best world of the laissez-faire equi-
librium where the externality of ecosystem management eﬀorts is present. Whether
welfare W ? = n









with δ depends on the relative size of two eﬀects: (i) the direct eﬀect of increased
transaction costs, which is always negative (this is the only eﬀect present in the
ﬁrst best), and (ii) the eﬀect that increased costs of ﬁnancial insurance lead to in-
12creased individual ecosystem management eﬀorts (Proposition 1). The second eﬀect
is weighted by the size of the external eﬀect,
τ















?)) > 0. (14)
The condition for whether one or the other eﬀect dominates is given in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4
With increasing costs of ﬁnancial insurance, welfare in the laissez-faire equilibrium













1 + nβ ζ x?(β−α)ζ +
αζ
α + β nβ ζ−1 x?(β−α)ζ

< = > 1 − β +
(1 − )α + nβ ζ ( 1
n − )β
1 + nβ ζ x?(β−α)ζ
q?
η − q?. (16)
Proof: see Appendix A.5.
On the right hand side of Condition (15), we have the direct eﬀect that expen-
ditures for ﬁnancial insurance increase with δ. This eﬀect decreases welfare. On the
left hand side of Condition (15), we have the indirect eﬀect that individual eﬀort to
improve ecosystem quality increases (Proposition 1). This improves welfare by an
amount equal to the positive externality τ? which the individual eﬀort of ecosystem
management has on the other ecosystem managers. The overall welfare eﬀect de-
pends on the balance between these two eﬀects. In particular, if the indirect eﬀect
is suﬃciently large welfare even increases with the costs of ﬁnancial insurance.
In order to better understand under which conditions the indirect eﬀect domi-
nates over the direct eﬀect, so that welfare actually increases with costs of ﬁnancial
insurance, we consider two special cases. First, consider the case of strong ecologi-
cal complementarity between species, i.e. ζ → −∞. Then, the term in brackets on
the left hand side of condition (16) is strongly negative. Hence, if α > β, welfare
decreases with δ. If, however, β > α, welfare increases with the costs of ﬁnancial
insurance: the welfare eﬀect of increased individual management eﬀort is so large
that it outweighs the negative direct eﬀect of more expensive ﬁnancial insurance.
As another special case, consider that the slope of the species-area curve is the
same at the higher and the lower scale, i.e. α = β. In this case, condition (16)
13simpliﬁes to
0 < = > 1 − β + β
1 −  + nβ ζ ( 1
n − )
1 + nβ ζ
q?
η − q? (17)
Then, for a negative , the sign of the right hand side is always positive. That means,
for ecosystems with low natural insurance function, and if ecological processes at
the local and global scales are similar, welfare unambiguously decreases with δ. If
 is positive, and both β and  are close to one, the right hand side is negative
if n is large. A large number n of ecosystem users means that the external eﬀect
of ecosystem management is strong, such that the beneﬁt from higher individual
ecosystem management eﬀort eventually can outweigh the negative direct eﬀect on
welfare.
To summarize, welfare in the laissez-faire equilibrium may increase with the costs
of ﬁnancial insurance for ecosystems with the following properties: (i) local and
global biodiversity eﬀects are strong ecological complements, ζ  0; (ii) the slopes
of the species-area curves are large (close to one), and the slope of the species-area
curve is higher on the global scale than on the local scale, β > α; (iii) the ecosystem
has a high natural insurance function, i.e. ecosystem quality strongly reduces the
variance of ecosystem services,  > 0; (iv) the number n of ecosystem users is large.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
We have analyzed how risk-averse ecosystem users manage an ecosystem for the
services it provides. The ecosystem model captures two stylized facts, as identiﬁed
in the ecological literature: (i) Biodiversity is inﬂuenced by ecosystem processes
operating at diﬀerent hierarchical scales. We have considered two such scales: indi-
vidual management action aﬀects processes at the local scale, while aggregate action
aﬀects processes at the global scale. Thus, an individual management action has
not only a private beneﬁt, but also a positive externality on other ecosystem users.
Considering land set aside for habitat as the management action, biodiversity on
both scales can be described by a species-area relationship, with diﬀerent ‘slopes’ at
both scales.
(ii) The variance of ecosystem services decreases with biodiversity. Thus, bio-
diversity enhancing ecosystem management has a natural insurance function. Fi-
nancial insurance is a substitute for natural insurance from biodiversity. As a con-
sequence, higher costs of ﬁnancial insurance lead to a higher demand for natural
insurance, and thus, to a higher level of biodiversity.
Due to the externality of individual management eﬀort, the laissez-faire equilib-
rium is not eﬃcient. In order to study how the public good-problem is aﬀected by
14the availability of ﬁnancial insurance we have analyzed how (i) the extent of reg-
ulation necessary to implement the eﬃcient allocation and (ii) how welfare in the
laissez-faire equilibrium depend on the transaction costs of ﬁnancial insurance.
How the Pigouvian subsidy, as a measure of the extent of eﬃcient regulation,
is aﬀected by ﬁnancial insurance depends on how management eﬀort at the indi-
vidual and the aggregate scales contribute to ecosystem quality. In particular, the
Pigouvian subsidy decreases with higher costs per unit of ﬁnancial insurance if (i)
biodiversity at the lower and higher ecosystem scales are ecological complements
and (ii) if the slope of the species-area relationship is higher at the higher scale.
While the condition of ecological complementarity of species holds for many
ecosystems (Tilman 1997), there is no clear ecological evidence on whether the ‘slope’
of the species-area relationship is higher on the higher or lower scale. However,
Durrett and Levin (1996) argue that the slope of the species-area relationship is
higher, the higher the rate is at which new species enter the system, either by in-
migration or by mutation. It seems plausible that this rate and, correspondingly, the
slope of the species-area relationship, is higher on the higher scale. Thus, it seems
plausible for many ecosystems that higher costs of ﬁnancial insurance decrease the
size of the externality and, hence, the extent of regulation which is necessary to
solve the public good problem.
If such regulation does not exist, or is not properly enforced, it can even be the
case that higher costs of ﬁnancial insurance increase welfare. This is, in principle,
well-known from second-best theory. For the issue studied here, we have derived
a condition on ecosystem functioning under which this happens. Although the di-
rect eﬀect of higher costs of ﬁnancial insurance is unambiguously negative, there
exist ecosystems – identiﬁed by Condition (16) – for which the indirect eﬀect is
substantially positive and even outweighs the negative direct eﬀect: higher costs of
ﬁnancial insurance induce a more extensive individual use of biodiversity as a natu-
ral insurance, which has positive external eﬀects on other ecosystem users via global
ecosystem processes. In particular, the following ecosystems properties contribute
to this condition being fulﬁlled: (i) local and global biodiversity eﬀects are strong
ecological complements; (ii) the slopes of the species-area curves are large and the
slope of the species-area curve is higher on the global scale than on the local scale;
(iii) the ecosystem has a high natural insurance function; (iv) the number of ecosys-
tem users is large. Thus, laissez-faire welfare increases with the costs of ﬁnancial
insurance if the ecosystem under consideration has a high natural insurance function
with large external beneﬁts.
These results are highly relevant for environmental and development policy. In
15so far as it is one aim of development policy to introduce, and improve access to,
ﬁnancial and insurance markets, our results show that such a policy has negative im-
plications for ecosystem quality. Furthermore, our results highlight that ecosystem
properties determine whether welfare increases or decreases under such a policy. The
underlying reasons are the substitution of biodiversity’s natural insurance function
by ﬁnancial insurance, and the associated reduction of external beneﬁts of indi-
vidual conservative ecosystem management. Unless a sound environmental policy
is in place, improving ecosystem users’ access to ﬁnancial and insurance markets
regardless of ecosystem properties may have adverse welfare eﬀects.
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A Appendix
A.1 Fair insurance premium




0 f(ν)dν if y ≤ ˜ y










2var y . (A.2)
Clearly, lim˜ y→∞ ˜ f(y) = f(y). Consider the insurance contract under the probability den-
sity function (A.1) that losses compared to ˜ y are insured against, i.e. if yi < ˜ y, the insurance
company pays an amount ai (˜ y − yi) of money to the insurant. (The contract considered
19in this paper is the particular case ˜ y → ∞.) The fair premium πi, i.e. the premium, which
equals the expected payoﬀ, of such a contract is
πi = Ezi [ai (˜ y − yi)] . (A.3)
This premium has to be paid in any event. If the actual income yi is below ˜ y, however, the
insurant additionally receives the indemniﬁcation beneﬁt. The net payment to (or from)
the insurance company amounts to
Ezi [ai (˜ y − yi)] − ai (˜ y − yi) = −Ezi [ai yi] + ai yi = ai (yi − Eyi) . (A.4)
This expression does not depend on ˜ y, but only on the mean Eyi of the probability distri-
bution of incomes. In particular, we obtain the same expression in the limit ˜ y → ∞.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1








σ20(q(xi,X)) [qx(xi,X) + qX(xi,X)] = c (A.5)
[−δ + ρ(1 − ai)] σ2(q(xi,X)) = 0 (A.6)





which is the same for all decision makers. We denote by ˜ X the aggregate eﬀort of all
ecosystem managers except for manager i, i.e. ˜ X = X − xi. Using (A.7), the ﬁrst order
condition with respect to xi is
−σ20(q(xi,xi + ˜ X))
h




δ [2ρ − δ]
(A.8)
To prove that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, we proceed in three steps: (i)
we prove that a solution x? to (A.5) is unique, (ii) we prove that xi = x? for all i = 1,...,n
is a Nash-equilibrium. This is done by showing that xi = x? solves (A.8), if ˜ X = (n−1)x?.
And (iii) we prove that no asymmetric Nash-equilibrium exists.
Ad (i). A solution x? of (A.5) is unique, because the right hand side c is constant,
while the left hand side is decreasing with x?;
−
d
dx?σ20 [qx + qX] = −σ200 [qx + qX] [qx + nqX] − σ20 [qxx + (n + 1)qxX + nqXX] ≤ 0 ,
(A.9)
where we omitted arguments for the sake of a clearer exposition.
Ad (ii). To show that the symmetric allocation xi = x? for all i = 1,...,n is a Nash
equilibrium, we assume ˜ X = (n − 1)x? is given for manager i. In this case, the optimal
20eﬀort for manager i is x?, because xi = x? solves Condition (A.5) uniquely. By symmetry,
xi = x? for all i = 1,...,n.
Ad (iii). Consider the two cases (a) ˜ X > (n−1)x? and (b) ˜ X < (n−1)x?. In case (a),
the optimal eﬀort for manager i is xi < x?. To prove this, we diﬀerentiate Condition (A.8)




σ200 [qx + qX] qX + σ20 [qxX + qXX]
σ200 [qx + qX]
2 + σ20 [qxx + 2qxX + qXX]
, (A.10)
which is negative. Since xi = x? for ˜ X = (n − 1)x?, xi < x? for ˜ X > (n − 1)x?. Due
to the symmetry, this contradicts the assumption ˜ X > (n − 1)x?, since all ecosystem
managers would choose xi < x?. Hence, there is no equilibrium where ˜ X > (n − 1)x?.
With a similar argument, we can rule out case (b). Hence, xi = x? for all i = 1,...,n is
the unique equilibrium.
Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order conditions (A.5) implicitly with respect to δ, we obtain
dx?
dδ
= a? σ20 [qx + qX]
1






< 0 , (A.12)
where
A? = −
δ [2ρ − δ]
2ρ
h
σ200 [qx + qX][qx + nqX] + σ20 [qxx + (n + 1)qxX + nqXX]
i
. (A.13)
dq?/dδ > 0 follows from dx?/dδ > 0 and Equation (1).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2






µ − cxi − δ ai σ2(q(xi,X)) −
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j=1 xj. This is true by Jensen’s inequality, because the welfare function is
concave in xi for any given X.8 Hence, we have to ﬁnd the level x of eﬀort to improve
ecosystem quality, which maximizes
n
h
µ − cx − δ ai σ2(q(x,nx)) −
ρ
2
(1 − a)2 σ2(q(x,nx))
i
(A.15)
8The idea for this proof is taken from Bramoull´ e and Treich (2005).
21Since this is a strictly concave function of both x and a, the solution is uniquely determined








σ20(q(x,nx)) [qx(x,nx) + nqX(x,nx)] = c (A.16)
[−δ + ρ(1 − a)] σ2(q(x,nx)) = 0 (A.17)
Diﬀerentiating these conditions implicitly with respect to δ, we obtain
dˆ x
dδ









< 0 , (A.19)
where
ˆ A = −
δ [2ρ − δ]
2ρ
h
σ200 [qx + nqX]2 + σ20 [qxx + 2nqxX + n2 qXX]
i
< 0 . (A.20)
dˆ q/dδ > 0 follows from dˆ x/dδ > 0 and Equation (1).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Ad 1. In order to derive the comparative statics of ˆ τ with respect to δ, we diﬀerentiate (12)
with respect to δ. This yields (omitting arguments)
dˆ τ
dδ








[qxX + nqXX] σ20 + qX σ200 [qx + nqX]
i dˆ x
dδ








σ200 [qx + nqX]2 + σ20 [qxx + 2nqxX + n2 qXX]
 (A.22)
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= − (n − 1)ˆ aσ20 qX qxx + nqX qxX − qx xxX − nqx qXX
σ200
σ20 [qx + nqX]2 + qxx + 2nqxX + n2 qXX
(A.24)











σ20 [qx + nqX]2 + qxx + 2nqxX + n2 qXX
(A.25)
22Since the denominator of this expression is negative and σ20 is negative, too, the change














qx(ˆ x,n ˆ x)
qX(ˆ x,n ˆ x)
d
dx
qX(ˆ x,n ˆ x)
qx(ˆ x,n ˆ x)
, (A.26)
which is the elasticity of the marginal rate of substitution between individual and aggregate
eﬀects on local biodiversity. Using the speciﬁcation (1), this elasticity is (β − α)ζ.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4













with respect to δ, and plugging in the equilibrium conditions (A.5).
Ad 2.: Using the functional forms for q(x,X), Equation (1), we derive
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Plugging this into (15) and rearranging leads to (16).
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